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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
  In this consolidated appeal, Carlos Orlando Zamora appeals from the district 
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  After the district court denied his motion, 
Mr. Zamora entered conditional guilty pleas to two counts of felony intimidating a 
witness; one count of felony possession of a controlled substance; one count of 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance; one count of misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia; two counts of misdemeanor domestic battery; and 
four counts of misdemeanor violation of a no contact order.   Subsequently, Mr. Zamora 
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but the district court denied the motion.1  
Mr. Zamora nevertheless asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Supreme Court Docket Nos. 43556 (district court case number CR15-3133), 
43557 (CR15-3183), 43558 (CR15-4483), 43559 (CR15-4484), and 43560 (CR15-6212) 
have been consolidated for appellate purposes.  (R., p.444.) 
 On February 16, 2015, Caldwell Police Officer Glynn responded to a report of a 
domestic disturbance at a motel.  (R., p.23.)  Upon arrival, he spoke with Mr. Zamora 
and Lacy Hartman.  (R., p.23.)  According to Officer Glynn, Ms. Hartman was shaking, 
her lower left lip was bleeding and swollen, and she had bruising above her left eye as 
well as on her neck and arms.  (R., p.23.)  Ms. Hartman said that Mr. Zamora told her 
                                            
1 Mr. Zamora is not challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
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he was going to kill her, hit her several times, and had attempted to strangle her a few 
days earlier.  (R., p.23.)  Mr. Zamora was arrested and initially charged, in case number 
CR 2015-3183, with one count of attempted strangulation, one count of domestic 
battery with traumatic injury, and one count of second degree kidnapping.  (R., pp.24-
26.)  A no-contact order with Ms. Hartman was also entered.  (R., p.31.)  Mr. Zamora 
waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court.  (R., p.36.)  On 
February 17, 2015, a public defender was appointed to represent him.  (R., p.29.)   
 After Mr. Zamora’s arrest, officers located methamphetamine, marijuana, and 
drug paraphernalia in the motel room.  (R., p.118.)  As such, Officer Glynn issued 
Mr. Zamora a misdemeanor citation (case number CR 2015-3133) for possession of 
drug paraphernalia and possession of a controlled substance.  (R., p.8.)  Mr. Zamora 
was also charged, in case number CR 2015-4483, with one count of felony possession 
of a controlled substance and a prior drug offense enhancement.  (R., pp.139-42.) 
While Mr. Zamora was being held at the Canyon County Detention Center, 
officers reviewed his phone records and discovered he had made phone calls to 
Ms. Hartman in which he tried to convince her to tell the authorities that he did not 
commit any crimes.  (R., p.169.)  Subsequently, Crystal Walker, an investigator at the 
sheriff’s office, met with Mr. Zamora, advised him of his Miranda rights, and Mr. Zamora 
answered her questions.  (R., pp.169, 345-46; State’s Exhibit B, MP3 Audio of 
Interview.)  Specifically, Ms. Walker asked him whether he had contacted Ms. Hartman.  
(State’s Exhibit B, MP3 Audio of Interview at 1:00 – 1:12.)  Mr. Zamora said he only 
contacted Ms. Hartman once — before he was made aware of the no-contact order — 
and did not talk with her about his charges; he also admitted to hitting Ms. Hartman.  
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(State’s Exhibit B, MP3 Audio of Witness Interview at 1:12 - 1:22.)  Another no-contact 
order was entered, and Mr. Zamora was later charged, in case number CR 2015-4484, 
with one count of intimidating a witness.  (R., pp.168, 182-83.) 
Approximately one month later, officers again reviewed Mr. Zamora’s phone 
records and discovered that he had made additional phone calls to Ms. Hartman.  
(R., pp.211-12.)  As a result, in case number CR 2015-6212, he was charged with an 
additional count of intimidating a witness and four misdemeanor counts of violating a 
no-contact order.  (R., pp.233-36.)  The district court later granted the State’s motion to 
consolidate all the cases.  (R., pp.254-55.) 
Prior to trial, Mr. Zamora filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss all 
charges, and a memorandum in support of the motion.  (R., pp.264-76.)  He argued 
that, because he had retained counsel on the initial charges, his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel was violated when Ms. Walker questioned him about whether he had made 
phone calls to Ms. Hartman.  (R., pp.267-76.)  At the hearing on the motion, he also 
argued that Ms. Walker’s interrogation violated his Fifth Amendment right under the 
federal constitution and his “Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under the concomitant 
provisions of the State Constitution in Article I, Section 13” as the Idaho constitution 
provided more protection.  (R., p.346; 6/4/15 Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.7, L.15, p.28, L.23 – p.32, 
L.25, p.39, L.6 – p.45, L.10.)  
The district court denied the motion.  (R., pp.345-51.)  It held that Idaho’s 
constitutional provisions do not provide more protection with respect to a defendant’s 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.2  (R., pp.347-48.)  It also held that there was no 
                                            
2 Mr. Zamora is not challenging the district court’s holding on this issue. 
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violation of Mr. Zamora’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.  (R., pp.348-51.)  In regard to 
the Fifth Amendment issue, the district court found that Mr. Zamora was interrogated 
while he was in custody, but he waived his Fifth Amendment rights.  (R., p.349.)  As 
such, the district court found that the only relevant issue was whether Mr. Zamora’s 
waiver was valid, and it held that the waiver was valid.  (R., p.349.) 
The district court also found that there was no violation of Mr. Zamora’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  (R., p.349.)  It held that Mr. Zamora’s Sixth Amendment rights were 
not violated because Ms. Walker was investigating “alleged offenses that had not yet 
been charged.”  (R., pp.350-51.)  Additionally, it held that while Mr. Zamora did have a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the charges for which he was in custody, “his 
waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to the Miranda waiver also served to 
waive any Sixth Amendment right he may have wished to assert.”  (R., p.351.) 
Subsequently, pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement, Mr. Zamora agreed to 
enter conditional Alford3 pleas to two counts of felony intimidating a witness; one count 
of felony possession of a controlled substance; one count of misdemeanor possession 
of a controlled substance; one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia; 
two counts of misdemeanor domestic battery; and four counts of misdemeanor violation 
of a no contact order.4  (R., pp.394-99; 6/15/15 Tr., p.73, Ls.14-22, p.116, Ls.5-7.)  In 
exchange, the State agreed not to file any additional charges and to dismiss the second 
                                            
3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
4 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State amended the information in district court 
case number CR 2015-3183 by reducing the attempted strangulation and felony 
domestic battery charges to two counts of misdemeanor domestic battery.   (6/15/15 
Tr. p.66, Ls.16-19, p.94, L.17 – p.96, L.13; R., pp.38-39.) 
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degree kidnapping charge as well as the prior drug offense enhancement.  (R., pp.394-
95.) 
At the sentencing hearing, for the two counts of intimidating a witness, the district 
court imposed concurrent sentences of five years, with two years fixed.  (8/26/15 
Tr., p.133, Ls.18-22; R., pp.202-03, 431-32.)  For the felony possession of a controlled 
substance charge, the district court imposed a concurrent sentence of seven years, with 
two years fixed.  (8/26/15 Tr., p.133, Ls.11-15; R., pp.151-52.)  For the four 
misdemeanor counts of violation of a no-contact order, the district court imposed 
concurrent sentences of 180 days in jail.  (8/26/15 Tr., p.135, Ls.19-25; R., pp.422-25.)  
For the two misdemeanor counts of domestic battery, the district court imposed 
concurrent sentences of 180 days in jail.  (8/26/15 Tr., p.136, Ls.5-10; R., pp.107-08.)  
And for the one misdemeanor count of possession of a controlled substance and the 
one misdemeanor count of possession of drug paraphernalia, the district court imposed 
concurrent sentences of 365 days in jail.  (8/26/15 Tr., p.16-24; R., pp.13-14.)  
Thereafter, Mr. Zamora filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the district court’s 
judgments.  (R., pp.433-36.)                





Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Zamora’s motion to suppress and dismiss?
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ARGUMENT 





  The district court denied Mr. Zamora’s motion to suppress and dismiss based on 
its findings that Mr. Zamora’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated when 
Ms. Walker questioned him about whether he had made phone calls to Ms. Hartman.  
Mindful of the fact that the district court found that Mr. Zamora waived his rights and 
voluntarily spoke to Ms. Walker, Mr. Zamora asserts that the district court erred when it 
denied his motion because its finding was not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated 
standard.  State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998).  The Court accepts the 
trial court’s determinations of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely 
reviews “the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  Id. 
   
C. The District Court Erroneously Concluded That Mr. Zamora’s Fifth And Sixth 
Amendment Rights Were Not Violated 
 
 
1. The District Court Erred When It Held That Mr. Zamora’s Fifth Amendment 
Rights Were Not Violated 
 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  In Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court adopted prophylactic 
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measures to protect a suspect’s right against the “inherently compelling pressures” of 
custodial interrogation, “which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to 
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”  Id. at 467.  As such, 
law enforcement must warn a suspect prior to questioning “that he has a right to remain 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that 
he has a right to the presence of an attorney . . . .”  Id. at 444.  If the suspect then 
requests an attorney or states that he wishes to remain silent, he cannot be questioned.  
Id. at 444-45.   
While a suspect can choose to waive his Miranda rights, such a waiver must be 
made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  But “an 
explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the 
defendant waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel . . . .”  North 
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979).  In other words, an implicit waiver can 
be found from the “particular facts and circumstances surrounding” the case “including 
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”  Id. at 374-75.  “The question 
is not one of form, but whether the appellant, in light of the totality of circumstances 
surrounding [his] statements, knowingly and intelligently waived [his] Miranda rights.”  
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 498 (1983).  Such a finding must be supported by 
substantial and competent evidence.  State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852 (2001).      
  In this case, both parties conceded that Mr. Zamora never invoked his right to 
counsel when Ms. Walker read him his Miranda rights.  (R., p.347; 6/4/15 Tr., p.43, 
Ls.18-21.)  However, Mr. Zamora argued that he did not waive his Miranda rights 
because, in response to Ms. Walker’s reading of his rights, Mr. Zamora only said “Okay” 
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after Ms. Walker told him he could discontinue the interrogation at any time, and he then 
started answering her questions; he did not specifically acknowledge that he was 
waiving his rights or that he understood those rights.  (6/4/15 Tr., p.39, Ls.6-10, p.53, 
L.9 – p.54, L.12.)  Nevertheless, the district court held that Mr. Zamora waived his 
Miranda rights.  (R., p.349.)  It said that Mr. Zamora “was read the Miranda warnings 
and indicated he understood them.  He further was told that he could terminate the 
questioning at any time and indicated he also understood that.  He then proceeding (sic) 
to answer questions and did not invoke any of the Miranda warnings, thereby waiving 
any Fifth Amendment protections he may have had.”  (R., p.349.) 
Mindful of the fact that the audio recording of the interrogation reveals that 
Mr. Zamora confirmed that he understood his Miranda rights and said “Okay” after 
Ms. Walker told him he could terminate the interrogation at any time, Mr. Zamora 
argues that the district court erred when it found that Mr. Zamora validly waived his 
Miranda rights because its finding was not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence.  Mr. Zamora asserts that the audio recording does not prove that his waiver 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because his simple response of “Okay” did not 
make it clear that he understood his rights before he started answering questions.  
(State’s Exhibit B, MP3 Audio of Witness Interview at 00:25 – 00:52.)  Thus, the district 




2. The District Court Erred When It Held That Mr. Zamora’s Sixth 
Amendment Right To Counsel Was Not Violated 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI.  However, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is “offense specific.”  
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).  It attaches “at or after the initiation of 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary 
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.  Id. (citations omitted).  From that point 
forward, it “guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ 
stages of the criminal proceedings,” and “[i]nterrogation by the State is such a stage.”  
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (citations omitted).  This right, however, 
can also be waived if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Id.  And the 
Montejo Court held that a defendant can waive this right “whether or not he is already 
represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled.”  Id. (citing 
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1990)).  The Court went on to say that 
“when a defendant is read his Miranda rights . . . and agrees to waive those rights, that 
typically does the trick, even though the Miranda rights purportedly have their source in 
the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. 
In light of this precedent, the district court in this case said “unless charges have 
been brought, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel simply does not apply.”  
(R., p.350.)  As such, the district court found that the Sixth Amendment did not apply in 
this situation for two reasons.  First, because Ms. Walker “was investigating alleged 
offenses that had not yet been charged . . . .”  (R., p.350.)  And second, because, even 
though Mr. Zamora had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the charges for which 
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he was in custody, “his waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to the Miranda 
waiver also served to waive any Sixth Amendment right he may have wished to assert.”  
(R., p.351.) 
Mindful of the applicable precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment right is 
offense specific, and the fact that Ms. Walker’s questions focused on alleged charges 
as opposed to the charges for which he was incarcerated, Mr. Zamora asserts that the 
district court erred when it held that he did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
because the alleged charges were based on actions that would not have occurred if he 
was not incarcerated on the original charges.  In other words, the alleged charges and 
the original charges for which he had already retained counsel were so closely 
intertwined that Mr. Zamora’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached on the alleged 
charges also. 
Further, Mr. Zamora asserts that Montejo did not apply in this situation because, 
as argued above, his Fifth Amendment waiver was not valid.  Thus, he did not waive his 
Sixth Amendment rights on the charges for which he was in custody.  Therefore, the 
district court erred when it denied Mr. Zamora’s motion to suppress and dismiss.    
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Zamora respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s 
judgments of conviction and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress and 
dismiss. 
 DATED this 29th day of April, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      REED P. ANDERSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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